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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the trial Court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of

adjustments to Wasatch's financial statements to prove Roger Eggett's claim for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Standard of Review: Whether parol evidence is admissible to prove a claim for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law is reviewed for correction
of error; whether particular evidence was properly admitted is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889
P.2d 445, 455 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
Preservation of Issue: Wasatch objected to the admission of the evidence to vary the
unambiguous contractual terms, as a violation of the parol evidence rule. (Trial Transcript,
hereinafter "Tr./' 256-57, 264), as well by motion for directed verdict (Tr. 908-09), pretrial
motion in limine (Tr. 1 -8), and pretrial motion to compel discovery (Record, hereinafter "R.,"
141,165-68).
Wasatch's brief makes no mention of Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant, and
does not challenge the admission or admissibility of the evidence to prove the breach of
covenant claim. Accordingly, Wasatch's appeal that admission violated the parol evidence
rule is moot.

2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion under Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) in

clarifying the jury's intention and verdict that $135,671.96 was the book value of Roger
Eggett's shares, and the amount to be awarded to Eggett for his shares?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 (Utah
1963). See also, discussion and authorities at 29, infra, & n. 6. Wasatch wrongly asserts
that the standard of review is correction of error, citing Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr.
Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1995). Bennion, however, is an appeal of a denial of a motion for
a new trial under Rule 59(a). It makes no mention of Rule 47(r), and no mention of the
standard of review under either Rule 59(a) or 47(r).
Preservation of Issue. Wasatch objected to the trial Court's authority to clarify the
jury's intention and verdict. (Tr. 990, 994). Wasatch never objected to the form of the
questions asked, and has waived its objections to the form of the questions.
3.

Whether the trial Court abused its discretion in awarding costs and attorney's

fees to Roger Eggett as the prevailing party?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988); Schafirv. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994).
Preservation of Issue: Wasatch objected to the propriety of the fees by post trial
motion. (R. 331). Wasatch never objected to the adequacy of the trial Court's findings, or
to the form of Supplemental Judgment. Indeed, Wasatch approved the Supplemental
Judgment as to form. (Appellant's Brief Addendum, hereinafter "App. Br" or "App. Br.
Add.," at 6.) Wasatch has waived its appeal based upon the adequacy of the trial Court's
findings.
2

DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Plaintiff/Appellee Roger Eggett agrees with the Statement of Determinative Legal
Provisions by Defendant/Appellant Wasatch Energy Corp.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellee Roger Eggett ("Eggett") is the founder and former president of
Defendant/Appellant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"), and the former chairman of its
Board of Directors. In April 1997, Eggett resigned as president and board chairman. At that
time, Eggett was the largest shareholder, owning 36.5% of Wasatch's shares. (Tr. 256.)
Eggett's resignation as board chairman was effective immediately; his resignation as
president was to be effective after 90 days, pursuant to his Employment Agreement In May
1997, Wasatch purported to terminate Eggett for cause. Based on the purported termination,
Wasatch asserted that a Shareholders' Agreement entitled Wasatch to purchase Eggett's
shares for par value ($1,216.70, or 50 per share) rather than book value. (App. Br. Add 36.)
Eggett brought this action, alleging three claims for relief. (R. 1-7.) The first claim
alleged that Wasatch breached his Employment Agreement by refusing to pay Eggett
compensation he was owed from January 1,1997 through his resignation. The second claim
alleged that Wasatch breached his Shareholders' Agreement by refusing to pay Eggett book
value for his shares. The third claim alleged that Wasatch breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing inherent in the Employment Agreement and Shareholders' Agreement.
Wasatch asserted counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and breach of
contract, alleging that Eggett took excessive compensation between 1995 and his resignation,
and abused his expense account. (R. 17-26.)
3

The jury found for Eggett on all his claims and against Wasatch on all its
counterclaims. The jury awarded Eggett $11,188 in additional compensation, which was
equal to the remaining compensation to be paid for March and April, 1997 ($9,634 + $2,254
= $11,188). The jury also awarded Eggett $135,671.96 as book value for his shares, which
was equal to Wasatch's audited book value ($75,452), with an adjustment for suspense
account items ($296,252), multiplied by Eggett's ownership percentage ($75,452 + $296,252
x 36.5% - $135,671.96). (App. Br. Add 7-10.)
Upon reading the Special Verdict Form, the trial Court clarified the jury's intention
and verdict that $135,671.35 was the book value of Eggett's shares, and the amount to be
awarded to Eggett, not the book value of all Wasatch shares. The trial Court questioned the
jury foreman twice, and then questioned all jurors. The jurors answered unanimously and
decisively that $135,671.96 was the amount to be paid to Eggett for his shares. The trial
Court then entered the verdict and discharged the jury. (Tr. 988-95.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wasatch makes no attempt to marshal the facts supporting the jury verdict. Instead,
Wasatch presents a highly distorted selection of facts and exhibits (e.g., the Goodfellow
report, App. Br. Add. 37-45) to make the same arguments that the jury rejected. On appeal,
of course, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the verdict. See, e^, Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 977 P.2d 508, 510 (Utah
App. 1999); E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d
1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). Those facts and inferences include:
4

Eggett's Founding of Wasatch and the Relevant
Provisions of the Shareholders' Agreement
Eggett founded Wasatch in the basement of his home in 1993, to market natural gas
between small producers and suppliers. (Tr. 107-08.)

Magna Energy Corp.("Magna")

became an investor in Wasatch in April 1995. (Tr. 122.) At that time, Eggett and two other
Wasatch shareholders and employees (Tod Cusick and Curtis Chisholm) entered separate
Employment Agreements with Wasatch, and entered a joint Shareholders' Agreement (App.
Br. Add. 21-30.)
In relevant part for this appeal, Paragraph 2 of the Shareholders' Agreement provided
that, upon the withdrawal of a shareholder from the corporation, the remaining shareholders
and then Wasatch would have the right and option to purchase the withdrawing shareholder's
shares. (App. Br. Add. 21.) Paragraph 3 of the Shareholders' agreement specified that a
shareholder who resigned would be paid book value for his shares; a shareholder who was
terminated for cause would be paid the lesser of book value or the price paid by the
shareholder for his shares. Id. Paragraph 18(c) specified the grounds for which Wasatch
could terminate an employee for cause.1 Paragraph 18(d) defined book value as "the
consolidated net shareholders' equity" as "certified to by the firm of independent public
accountants then regularly employed by" Wasatch. Paragraph 18(d) also specified that the

!

In summary, paragraph 18(c) specified that an employee could be terminated for (i)
a felony conviction or crime of moral turpitude); (ii) fraud with respect to the corporation or
theft of its assets; (iii) any material breach of the employee's obligations; (iv) repeated
neglect, malfeasance, or nonfeasance detrimental to the best interests of the corporation; or
(v) a substance abuse problem. (App. Br. Add. 27-28.)
5

determination of book value "shall be made on an accrual basis in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties."
Formation of the Compensation Committee and
Determination of Eggett's Compensation for 1996 and 1997
In late 1995, Wasatch formed a Compensation Committee to set Eggett's
compensation, because he did not want Wasatch's employees on the Board of Directors to
set his compensation or know what it was. The Committee consisted of Eggett and Magna's
two representatives on Wasatch's Board of Directors.

(Tr. 170-71.)

For 1996, the

Committee agreed to establish guidelines that gave Eggett discretion to set compensation for
all employees, so long as certain amounts of income were committed to retained earnings.
(Tr. 173-76.) Eggett committed substantially more money to retained earnings than the
guidelines required, and was commended by Magna's representative on the Compensation
Committee for taking less income than he could have. (Tr. 186-97, 220-23, 403-04.)
In late 1996 and early 1997, Eggett negotiated his 1997 compensation with Keith
Painter ("Painter*'), Magna's principal representative on the Compensation Committee. They
agreed that Eggett would receive a base salary of $84,000, plus 10% of the net income before
taxes. The Agreement was reflected in memos (Tr. 215-18), and confirmed by Painter at
Wasatch's Board of Directors meeting on March 21,1997, which was recorded on audio tape
and played to the jury at trial. Painter said to Eggett, "you and I are pretty much together on
your compensation, aren't we?" (Tr. 233, 237).

6

Eggett's Resignation
Due to disputes with Magna over the management of Wasatch, Eggett submitted a
letter of resignation dated April 15, 1997. Pursuant to his Employment Agreement, Eggett
gave 90 days notice of his resignation as president, and informed Wasatch that his last day
of employment would be July 15, 1997. (Tr. 125-30, 132-34.) At a Board meeting on April
16, 1997, Wasatch accepted Eggett's resignation, and approved a motion to offer Eggett the
"position of consultant, and negotiate terms with him should he accept this position." (Tr.
444.) By correspondence dated April 25,1997, Wasatch informed Eggett that "information
regarding the status of your employment with Wasatch will be forthcoming." (App. Br. Add.
32.) Eggett then retained counsel, who requested by correspondence dated April 29, 1997,
that Wasatch pay the compensation owed to Eggett pursuant to his agreement with the
Compensation Committee. (Tr. 145.)
Wasatch's Bad Faith Termination of Eggett for Cause
From the moment Eggett retained counsel to protect his interests, Wasatch acted in
bad faith to avoid honoring its agreement to pay Eggett's compensation, and to avoid
honoring its agreement to pay Eggett book value for his shares. By correspondence dated
May 16, 1997, Wasatch notified Eggett that he had been terminated for cause. (App. Br.
Add. 33-34.) The Board of Directors never gave Eggett an opportunity to be heard before
terminating him. (Tr. 435-37.) The purported grounds in large part tracked the report of an
accountant who reviewed Wasatch's books and records; the report concluded that Eggett
took excessive compensation and abused his expense account. (App. Br. Add. 37-45.) The
7

accountant never spoke to Eggett about his compensation or about the expense account; the
accountant was never even told that Eggett's compensation was set by a Compensation
Committee, because the report makes no reference to the Committee. Id, Two months later,
Wasatch implicitly admitted that the termination was specious, because Wasatch provided
a representation letter to its auditors stating that there had been no irregularities involving
management during the fiscal year. (Tr. 672-75.)
The evidence at trial proved that the grounds for termination were manufactured in
bad faith, to deprive Eggett of his compensation and book value for his shares. Wasatch
terminated Eggett for soliciting employee David Lillywhite to leave Wasatch, but the
evidence proved that Eggett did not solicit Lillywhite to leave, and had no interest in
Lillywhite's competing business. (Tr. 152-56.)
Wasatch terminated Eggett for fraud and theft in taking unauthorized compensation,
but the evidence proved that Eggett's compensation was agreed to by the Compensation
Committee, and that Eggett took less than he could have taken under the agreement. See,
supra, at 6 - 7. Wasatch terminated Eggett for refusing to disclose compensation figures to
the Board of Directors, but the evidence proved that Eggett provided the figures the only time
that a director requested them. (Tr. 212.) The audio tape of the March 21, 1997, Board
meeting also proved that Eggett offered to disclose all compensation figures, but the directors
said that they did not want to know. (Tr. 238-40.)
Wasatch terminated Eggett for abusing his expense account. For example, Wasatch
accused Eggett of improperly directing Wasatch to make his car payments, even though
8

Painter had approved the request three months earlier and thought that it was "no problem."
(Tr. 224-25,417-18.) Wasatch terminated Eggett for making a charitable contribution to the
Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, even though Wasatch had made contributions to charities
supported by Magna. (Tr. 159-62.)
Finally, Wasatch terminated Eggett for disruptive comments when Eggett announced
his resignation to employees on April 15,1997, even though the Board did not consider these
alleged comments worthy of termination at Board meetings on April 16, 18, and 29, when
Wasatch determined to retain Eggett as a consultant. (Tr. 443-50.)
Wasatch's Bad Faith Manipulation of the
Financial Statements to Reduce Book Value
In late 1996 and early 1997, Wasatch grew tremendously, faster than anyone
expected. (Tr. 125.) January through March 1997 were the most profitable months ever;
Wasatch made more than half a million dollars in January alone. (Tr. 249, 258, 770-75.)
After Wasatch terminated Eggett for cause, Wasatch management prepared the yearend financial statements for audit. In so doing, management made a series of adjustments
to the monthly financial statements that reduced Wasatch's income and audited book value
by hundreds of thousands of dollars. Wasatch made no adjustments that increased its stated
book value, even though Wasatch had every incentive to increase book value to show a
stronger financial position to its bankers and business partners. (Tr. 575-76, 663-64.)

9

Because the adjustments were contrary to Wasatch's incentive, Wasatch's only motive was
to deny Eggett book value for his shares.2 (R. 679.) These adjustments included:
Suspense Account Entries. When Eggett was president, Wasatch maintained a
suspense account, which included income actually received from certain customers where
there was a question or possible dispute about the amount. Wasatch held the income in the
suspense account for one year, to avoid treating it as earned income and paying bonuses or
profit sharing on it. At the end of each fiscal year, as Eggett prepared the financial
statements for audit, Eggett transferred entries that were more than a year old from the
suspense account to retained earnings. (Tr. 272-74.)
After Eggett was terminated, Wasatch management extended the suspense account
period from one to two years. (Tr. 274). Wasatch's auditors had no role in the decision; they
were just told about it. Wasatch told its auditors that it lengthened the suspense period to be
more consistent with industry practice and with its new contracts, but Wasatch's contracts
were short term and did not justify the change. (Tr., 274-77, 6767-78, 681.)
As a result of the adjustment, Wasatch transferred no income from the suspense
account to retained earnings for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1997. If Wasatch had
followed its prior practice under Eggett, and applied a one-year period, its auditors would
2

Ward Coombs, the Ernst & Young accountant with primary responsibility for
auditing Wasatch's financial statements, testified that management prepares the financial
statements; the auditor expresses an opinion on their fairness, but does not prepare them.
Coombs also testified that the auditor relies on the representations of management, and that
management could mislead the auditor if it wanted to. If management had a different reason
for doing something, the auditor would not know that. Wasatch could have made
adjustments solely to deprive Eggett of book value for his shares, and the auditor would
know a thing about it. (R. 671-72.)
10

have shifted $296,252 of income to retained earnings, and would have included it in the
calculation of book value. (Tr. 276-77, 682.)
Grynberg Adjustment. Wasatch kept in the suspense account an additional $45,553
because of a temporary dispute about amounts owed on the Grynberg contract. The dispute
lasted only a few days or weeks. Grynberg honored the contract in December 1996, and paid
the agreed-upon amounts in fiscal year 1997. Before Eggett's termination, the $45,553
would have been transferred from the suspense account to retained earnings. (Tr. 279-80.)
Swap Contract Adjustment. As a buyer and seller of natural gas, Wasatch entered
"offsetting" or "swap" supply contracts, which protected Wasatch against abrupt changes in
the price of natural gas. In early 1997, Wasatch negotiated two offsetting contracts, but one
was never executed, creating possible exposure on the executed contract. In preparing the
year-end financial statements after Eggett's termination, Wasatch held in reserve $283,000
in income earned that year to cover any exposure on the executed contract, and the auditors
did not include it in the calculation of book value. As of the end of the fiscal year, however,
the executed contract had not begun. It began in July 1997, and made money until October.
(Tr. 296.) At that time, Wasatch executed a new "offsetting" contract, that covered the losses
on the original contract, and protected Wasatch from losing money. (Tr. 268-71, 384-88;
513.)3

3

As further evidence of Wasatch's bad faith, Wasatch produced documents that
purportedly showed a loss of $489,000 on the executed contract. Wasatch never provided
information relating to the offsetting contract that canceled that loss. (Tr. 296, 373).
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Eggett's Testimony at Trial. At trial, Eggett calculated the book value of his shares
by restoring the adjustments made by Wasatch management in bad faith to deprive him of
book value. These were the same adjustments that Eggett would have made as president in
preparing the year-end financial statements for audit. (Tr. 299, 889.) In his initial testimony,
Eggett made another adjustment relating to the United Utilities lawsuit. Eggett withdrew the
adjustment in rebuttal, because the auditor testified that he, not Wasatch management, made
that adjustment. Wasatch management, however, made all other adjustments. (Tr. 890-92.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Wasatch appeals the admission of evidence of the accounting adjustments
on the wrong ground. Wasatch argues that the trial Court improperly admitted the evidence
to vary the definition of "Book Value" in the Shareholders' Agreement, in violation of the
parol evidence rule and other rules of contractual interpretation. The evidence, however, was
neither offered nor admitted for that purpose. The evidence was admitted on Eggett's claim
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing - to prove that Wasatch made
adjustments to the financial statements in bad faith to deprive Eggett of book value for his
shares, and to prove the true book value of Eggett's shares if Wasatch had not acted in bad
faith.
Because evidence must be admitted if it is admissible for one purpose but not another,
Wasatch's appeal is moot. Wasatch never mentions Eggett's breach of covenant claim, or
appeals the admission of the evidence on that claim. In any event, a long line of decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court and this Court has held that parol evidence is admissible to prove
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a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even if it is not admissible
to modify the express terms of a contract.
Point II. The trial Court acted well within its discretion in questioning the jurors to
clarify their intention and verdict. By questioning the jury foreman twice, and then
questioning all jurors to confirm the foreman's answers, the Court determined that
$135,671.96 was the book value of Eggett's shares, and the amount to be awarded to Eggett
for his shares, not the book value of all Wasatch shares. Wasatch's assertion that the trial
Court "coerced" the jury to accept the Court's "view" of the evidence is preposterous. The
trial Court never stated to the jury any "view"of the evidence, remained neutral in its
questions, and told the jurors that the Court wanted to know if they disagreed with the
foreman's answers.
The trial Court had ample discretion and authority to question the jurors to correct a
possible informal or insufficient verdict, pursuant to U. R. Civ. P. 47(r), and Jorgensen v.
Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963). By no stretch of the imagination were the trial Court's
questions arbitrary and capricious or otherwise an abuse of discretion. Moreover, Wasatch
objected to the trial Court's authority to correct the verdict, but did not object to the form of
the questions or seek clarification at trial of the jurors' answers. Wasatch therefore has
waived its objection to the form of the trial court's questions.
Finally, any error in the Court's questions is harmless. It is indisputable that the jury
calculated $135,671.96 as the book value of Eggett's shares. The jury foreman twice stated
that it was the amount to be "paid for the shares," and the jurors confirmed his answers. The
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jury clearly calculated the book value of Eggett's shares, because 5135,671.96 equals the
audited book value of Wasatch (575,452), adjusted by the suspense account items
(5296,252), and multiplied by Eggett's ownership percentage (36.5%).
Point III.

The trial Court acted well within its discretion in awarding Eggett

560,374.43 in costs and attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Eggett was awarded fees on
his claim for breach of the Shareholders' Agreement (which had an attorney's fee provision),
but not for breach of his Employment Agreement (which did not have such a provision). The
trial Court found that Eggett made a proper segregation of fees incurred before May 16,
1997, which related solely to Eggett's claims for breach of the Employment Agreement. The
trial Court also found that the claims for breach of the Shareholder Agreement were the
predominant claims at trial, that they were intertwined with Eggett's claims for breach of the
Employment Agreement and with Wasatch's counterclaims, and that it was not possible to
distinguish them. The trial Court awarded Eggett costs and fees on all claims incurred after
May 16, 1997, with the exception of certain fees that Eggett redacted from his request.
Numerous decisions by this Court authorize the trial Court to award "all attorney fees
reasonably incurred in the litigation" when a "plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a
common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least some it its claims."
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah App.1999). Further, Wasatch
has waived its objection to the adequacy of the trial Court's findings, because it approved the
Supplemental Judgment as to form and made no objection to the findings.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE ADJUSTMENTS TO BOOK VALUE WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED
ON EGGETT'S CLAIM THAT WASATCH BREACHED THE COVENANT
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
A.

Wasatch's Appeal Is Moot, Because Wasatch Does Not Dispute That the
Evidence Was Admissible to Prove That Wasatch Acted in Bad Faith, In
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

Wasatch argues that the trial Court erred in admitting evidence of the adjustments to
audited book value, because the Shareholders' Agreement stated that book value would be
based "on audited financial statements," and would be "binding and conclusive on the
parties." Wasatch argues that the Court violated the parol evidence rule, and allowed Eggett
to vary the plain meaning of the unambiguous contractual terms. (App. Br. at 13-15,20-21.)
Wasatch misses the point. At trial, Eggett never contended that the Shareholders'
Agreement was ambiguous, and did not offer the adjustments as evidence of the meaning of
the Agreement or the intention of the parties. Eggett offered the evidence to prove that
Wasatch breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in manipulating the year-end
financial statements to deprive him of book value.
Wasatch's brief does not make a single mention of Eggett's claim for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It was, however, the Third Claim for Relief in the
Complaint. (R. 6.) Undersigned counsel presented the claim in opening, and the trial Court
instructed the jury about the claim. (Tr. 69-70,79,921 -22.) Undersigned counsel argued the
claim in closing:
The third claim we have is for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
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dealing. As you've just heard the judge instruct you, the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is a covenant that adheres in every contract. And what
it says is that each party will treat the others honestly and fairly. We claim that
Wasatch did not treat Mr. Eggett fairly and honestly in terminating him or in
refusing to pay his compensation. We claim that they acted in bad faith and
I'm going to describe the facts to you in a moment that prove that bad faith.
(Tr. 938.) Undersigned counsel later told the jury that Wasatch management made the
adjustments to the accounting statements in bad faith to deprive Eggett of book value:
All these [adjustments] were made by management. As Mr. Stevens told you,
management had an incentive to inflate its income, to look (inaudible)
financial statements. The only reason to make these adjustments if you're
management in the face of that incentive, is to deny Mr. Eggett book value for
[his] shares.
(Tr. 975.)
The trial Court admitted evidence of the adjustments because they squarely related to
Eggett's breach of covenant claim. As the trial Court held in denying Wasatch's motion for
a directed verdict, Eggett was entitled to present evidence about how and why Wasatch
exercised its discretion in preparing the year-end financial statements:
MR. STEVENS:
Your Honor, this is my motion for a partial
dispositive ruling at the conclusion of the evidence. The ruling I'm asking for
with regard to the value of the shares and book value I think Mr. Eggett
testified that he understood it to be a June 30 date that was intended and we
agreed with that. We have an audited statement that has specific dates. The
agreement requires that it be the audited statement from the auditors and the
accrual [sic] and general [sic] accepted accounting practices and such.
Therefore, we feel that this is the number that should be in here and that should
not be left to the jury.
THE COURT: Okay. And I've already indicted to you — well, first
let me ask Mr. Love. Do you desire to respond on the record?
Mr. Love? Do you desire to respond to that?
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MR. LOVE:

I would just rest on what I said earlier, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court has already indicated to you that it's
the Court's view that the generally accepted accounting principles may be
affected by discretionary calls within the management or others in the
corporation and thus I believe that the plaintiff should have the opportunity to
present adjustments to that statement. He's not going to be specifically bound
to the audited statement of June 30 or the unaudited statement of December,
4
96, the June 30, '97, for the reason that after his termination by the
corporation financial decisions that are discretionary may be made and the
making of those discretionary decision[s] can affect his value should the
corporation elect to make those decisions obviously inconsistent with his
benefit. And, thus, he should be allowed to challenge that and show that
reasonable adjustments should be made to the financial statements as then
audited because of the, let's say, bias that had been incorporated by
discretionary calls of the officers. Okay?
MR. STEVENS:

Thank You.

THE COURT:
Now, I hope I've made that clear. If there is any
question about that, I think we've discussed that multiple times. It just seems
to me that it would be inequitable to require him to simply accept an audited
financial statement when that audited statement was prepared after the time
that he had been terminated from the corporation and can be influenced by
discretionary decisions made by the board or remaining officers. All right.
Thank you.
(Tr. 907-09) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Wasatch's assertion, App. Br. at 21, the trial Court did not admit the
evidence on "supposed equitable principles," but as evidence of "bias" or bad faith. The
evidence was properly admitted to prove a breach of the covenant, even if it was not
admissible to vary the plain language of the Shareholders' Agreement. See, e.g., Olympus
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 455 (Utah
App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) (evidence must be admitted if it is
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admissible for one purpose, but not another); Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah
1983); Utah R. Evid. 105.
Because Wasatch never mentions Eggett's breach of covenant claim, much less
appeal the admission of the evidence on that claim, Wasatch's appeal is moot.4
B.

The Adjustments Were Properly Admitted to Prove That Wasatch Acted in
Bad Faith, and to Prove Damages.

Even if Wasatch had properly appealed admission of the adjustments to prove
Eggett's breach of covenant claim, the appeal should be denied. The Utah Supreme Court
and this Court have long held that each party to a contract covenants to perform its duties in
good faith, and to do nothing to deprive the other party of the benefit of its bargain:
In this state, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not
all, contractual relationships. . . . Under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to
receive the fruits of the contract.... A violation of the covenant gives rise to
a claim for breach of contract. . . . To comply with his obligation to perform
a contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party.
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991).
If a contract gives a party discretion, that party must exercise its discretion in good
faith. That party breaches the covenant if it exercises its discretion to deprive the other party
of the benefit of its bargain. As this Court stated in Olympus Hills, supra, after a thorough

4

The appeal is moot even if, for the sake of argument, the trial Court admitted the
evidence on "supposed equitable principles," because this Court will affirm the trial Court's
decision on any proper ground, even if not considered by the trial Court. See, e.g., Doe v.
Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1998).
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review of Utah case law:
Instances inevitably arise in which one party exercises discretion retained in a
way that denies the other a reasonably expected benefit of the bargain. The law
of good faith and fair dealing, though inexact, attempts a remedy for such
abuse. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 385-86 (1980) ("The good faith
performance doctrine may be said to permit the exercise of discretion for any
purpose-including ordinary business purposes-reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties. A contract thus would be breached by a failure
to perform in good faith if a party uses its discretion for a reason outside the
contemplated range-a reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming
a breach.") Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, comment a (1979)
("[g]ood faith performance of enforcement of a contract emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party"). . . . [Cjourts have determined in a variety of
contexts that a contracting party can exercise a retained contracting power in
bad faith.
889 P.2d at 450-451 (emphasis added; case citations omitted). See also, Cook v. Zions First
Nat. Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996)
("When one party to a contract retains power or sole discretion in an express contract, it must
exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith"); Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706P.2d 1028,1037 (Utah 1985) (covenant forbids arbitrary
action, and prohibits party from exercising express contractual right to terminate contract in
bad faith); Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982)
(corporation acted in bad faith in failing to approve prospective business partners without
considering their merits, even though contract allowed corporation complete discretion in
approving prospective partners).
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Most important for Wasatch's appeal, parol evidence of the surrounding facts and
circumstances can and must be admitted to prove a breach of the covenant, and the resulting
injury and damage.

In St. Benedict's, supra, the trial court did precisely what Wasatch

requests here - apply the express terms of the contract and exclude parol evidence as to the
conduct of the parties. The Supreme Court reversed, stating unequivocally that an:
examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine
whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and
justified expectations of the other party. The purpose, intentions and
expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the contract
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties.
St. Benedict's, supra, 811 P.2d at 200.
A legion of Utah cases has cited St. Benedict's in admitting parol evidence at trial, or
considering it on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. In Cook v. Zions First Nat.
Bank, supra, this Court reversed summary judgment dismissing a breach of covenant claim,
emphasizing:
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the parties constructively
promised not to do anything to impair the other party's right to receive the
fruits of the contract. Compliance with the covenant depends upon the
justified expectations of the parties. As we have previously held, good faith
and fair dealing are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a
breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally inappropriate
for decision as a matter of law.
919 P.2d at 60-61 (emphasis added).
In Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah App. 1994), this Court refused to dismiss a
breach of covenant claim, because "many of the key historical facts, and the inferences fairly
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to be drawn therefrom, are in dispute." 871 P.2d at 565. This Court held:
Determining whether a breach of the covenant has occurred requires a review
of more than just the text of the contract itself.... This broad review required
to determine whether a breach has occurred is generally one of fact, not law,
and thus is ordinarily left to the jury or the finder of fact.
A/., at 564-65.
In Wester?! Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied,
879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994), this Court denied summary judgment after considering parol
evidence (including the affidavit of the opposing party), and stating that whether there has
been a breach of the covenant is "generally a factual issue to be determined by [the fact
finder] after consideration of all attendant circumstances and evidence" 860 P.2d at 380
(emphasis added). Accord, PDQ Lube Center, Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App.
1997); Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994);
American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 273 (Utah App. 1988).
As these cases make clear, evidence relating to the adjustments-those made by
Wasatch and by Eggett-was properly admitted to prove Wasatch's bad faith. Eggett argued
at trial that Wasatch made those adjustments to dramatically reduce the calculation of book
value in the year-end audited financial statements. Management had no incentive to reduce
book value other than to deny to Eggett the benefit of his bargain. Eggett testified about the
adjustments for the suspense account, the Grynberg contract, and the swap contract, to prove
the "true" book value of Wasatch if Wasatch had acted in good faith. (As a practical matter,
only the adjustment for the suspense account is relevant, because that is the only adjustment
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made by the jury.) The trial Court properly admitted this evidence to prove that Wasatch
exercised its discretion in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
C.

Wasatch's Authorities from Other Jurisdictions Are Fully Consistent with
Utah Law Relating to the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

Wasatch cites numerous authorities from other jurisdictions5 to the effect that parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary the meaning of "book value" in shareholder buy-out
agreements. App. Br. at 15-18. None of these authorities addresses Utah law relating to the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but all are consistent with it.
In Crowder Const. Co. v. Kiser, 517 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. App. 1999), the court
considered parol evidence in granting the corporation's motion for summary judgment. A
shareholder contended that certain adjustments should have been made to the audited
financial statements to determine book value for his buy-out agreement. To determine
whether the parties intended to make such adjustments, the court "look[ed] to all
circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement." 517 S.E.2d at 186. Based on the
parol evidence, the court concluded that the parties did not intend book value to be adjusted
as the shareholder claimed, had not made similar adjustments in earlier buy-outs of other
employees, and had consistently calculated adjusted book value in the same manner for other
management purposes. Id., at 187.

5

Wasatch also cites numerous Utah cases for the proposition that parol evidence is
inadmissible to vary the plain language of a contract. (App. Br. at 13-15.) None of these
cases addresses the meaning of "book value" in a shareholder buy-out agreement.
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Crowder held that the shareholder presented no evidence to suggest that the method
of calculation was intended to deprive the plaintiff of book value. The court distinguished
Miller Machine Co, v. Miller, 293 S.E.2d 622 (N.C. App. 1982), in which the corporation
allegedly concealed assets from its auditors to deprive the shareholder of book value:
In Miller, plaintiff corporation sought to meet its burden through the affidavits
of two certified public accountants (CPA's), whose credibility was not
questioned. The CPAs relied on the most recent audit of the corporate
financial statements in forming their opinion as to book value of the corporate
shares. The defendant in Miller filed the affidavit of Rachel Hailey, a shipping
clerk who was employed by the plaintiff corporation. Ms. Hailey averred in
her affidavit that prior to the most recent audit of the company books, some
$300,000.00 to 5400,000.00 of finished goods, as well as a large amount of
other inventory, were concealed from the company auditors. This court
indicated that the sworn statement of Ms. Hailey raised a question of fact about
the accuracy of the audit upon which the company's book value was based,
raising a genuine issue about "the correctness of the review and the book value
of the stock." Here, [the shareholder] has offered no evidence which raises
genuine issues of material fact about the calculation of adjusted book value on
the date of his termination from plaintiff corporation.
Id, at 185 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
Most important, the Crowder court held that the calculation of book value by an
accounting firm
in accordance with the terms of the 'buy-out' agreement. . . is presumptively
correct, in the absence of mathematical error, evidence of fraud (such as
willful concealment of assets) or evidence of a failure to follow generally
accepted accounting practices.
Id, at 189 (emphasis added). Here, of course, Eggett presented evidence that Wasatch
manipulated its financial statements to deprive Eggett of book value. As Crowder holds, that
evidence was admissible to rebut the presumption that audited book value was correct.
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The court in Jones v. Harris, 388 P.2d 539 (Wash. 1964), also held that audited book
value is not conclusive where it is determined "with an eye to the advantageous exercise of
a buy-out agreement":
"Book value" normally means the value of the corporation as shown on the
books of account of that corporation, after subtracting liabilities. In such cases
courts should accept the book accounts, when they are kept in accord with
accepted accounting practice and not with an eye to the advantageous exercise
of the "buy-out" option. If arbitrary valuations appear in the accounts, the
court can then substitute amounts determined through correct accounting
procedures.
388 P.2d at 542 (emphasis added).
In Area, Inc. v. Stentenfeld, 541 P.2d 755 (Alas. 1975), the court rejected a
corporation's attempt to rescind its buy-out of an employee's shares. The corporation
claimed that there was a mutual mistake, because the parties intended "book value" to
include an adjustment for a possible tax liability on certain deferred compensation. 541 P.2d
at 761. At trial, the court admitted parol evidence in finding that the parties "were fully
cognizant of the various factors making up the 'adjusted book value' of the corporate shares"
as reflected on the financial statements. Id. at 763. The court emphasized that there was no
"mistake of any kind" because the "parties had developed a method of computing book
value which had been approved by the board of directors and which had been consistently
utilized in the course of several prior stock transactions," even though it differed from
generally accepted accounting principles. Id. at 763-64. Stentenfeld is fully consistent with
the principle that parol evidence is admissible to prove that Wasatch acted in bad faith.
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So is Swecker v. Rau, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3301 (E. D. Pa. 1990). Swecker simply
held that the term "book value" in a stock repurchase agreement was unambiguous, and
refused to admit parol evidence that the parties intended book value to mean something else.
See 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis, at 7. The court granted summary judgment, because the
shareholder presented no evidence to prove that defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to
enter the agreement. Id. at 9-10.
Finally, in Sperco v. MS&D Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 973 (N.D. 111. 1989), the
court held that a corporation did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
paying net book value pursuant to a shareholder buy-out agreement, rather than fair market
value. The court distinguished the situation in which the corporation conceals actual book
value, or in which the shareholder contests "specific aspects" of the book value calculation.
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 3-4. Unlike the shareholder in Sperco, Eggett did not claim that
Wasatch should have calculated fair market value instead of book value; rather, Eggett
presented evidence Wasatch manipulated the calculation of book value in bad faith.
Wasatch implicitly admits that evidence relating to the adjustments is admissible to
prove fraud or mistake. Wasatch carefully states that Eggett's complaint "contained no
allegation of error or fraud in the audited financial statement," and concludes that in
the absence of any allegation of mathematical error, fraud, or departure from
generally accepted accounting principles, the value determined by the
independent accountants is "presumptively correct" and binding on the parties.
App. Br. at 20, 21.
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Of course, Wasatch ignores Eggett's breach of covenant claim.

There is no

meaningful distinction between fraud and bad faith; Wasatch cannot argue that evidence of
the adjustments was admissible to prove that Wasatch defrauded Eggett or the auditor, but
not admissible to prove that Wasatch manipulated book value "with an eye to the
advantageous exercise of the 'buy-out' option." Jones v. Harris, supra, 388 P.2d at 542.
Evidence of the adjustments was admissible pursuant to Wasatch's authorities, as well as the
many authorities of the Supreme Court and this Court construing the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
This Court therefore should affirm the trial Court's admission of evidence relating to
accounting adjustments made by Wasatch and by Eggett.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO
CLARIFY THE JURY'S INTENTION AND VERDICT THAT $135,671.96
WAS THE BOOK VALUE OF EGGETT'S SHARES, NOT THE BOOK
VALUE OF WASATCH.
A.

The Trial Court Acted Properly and Discreetly, Well Within Its Discretion,
and in Conformity with Utah Supreme Court Precedent.

When the jury returned, the trial Court read the Special Verdict Form, and the jury's
answer to each interrogatory, including Question No. 5:
Question 5. On the date for evaluation of the shares you selected
above, what was the book value of Wasatch Energy as defined by the
shareholders agreement? That, the answer is $135,671.96.
(Tr. 989.) Almost immediately, the trial Court asked the jury foreman if this verdict was the
"value that the jury believes should be paid for the shares?" The jury foreman answered that
it was book value to be "paid for the shares." (Tr. 990) (emphasis added). After an
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objection by Wasatch's counsel, the trial Court asked the jury foreman the same question,
and the jury foreman gave the same answer. After further objection, the trial Court polled
the jurors to determine if each intended $135,671.96 to be the amount awarded to Eggett for
his shares. Each juror answered unanimously and decisively that it was. The trial Court
entered the verdict, finding that Question No. 5
is ambiguous in its right [sic] and the way it was written and the jury was [sic]
spoken that the value is due to Mr. Eggett is for the lost compensation,
$11,888.00 and for his shares of stock, $135,671.96.
(Tr. 993.) The trial Court then discharged the jury. Id.
In clarifying the jury's intention and verdict, the trial court substantially followed a
procedure approved by the Utah Supreme Court in Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934
(Utah 1963). In Jorgensen, a personal injury action, the jury awarded plaintiff "odd
amounts" in general and special damages. The "odd amounts" prompted the trial court
to question the jury foreman about the possibility of a quotient or chance
verdict. In connection with this questioning it came out that the jury had
considered as one aspect of plaintiff s general damages, her travel expense
from California to Utah. Defendant asserted this was a matter improper to
consider, which was conceded by the plaintiff, and the court directed the jury
to go out and reconsider its verdict. They did so and returned with a
second verdict....
383 P.2d at 935 (emphasis added).
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's "prerogative" to question
the jurors and direct them to redeliberate, pursuant to U. R. Civ. P. 47(r):
Rule 47(r) U.R.C.P. provides that, "if the verdict . . . is informal or
insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or
the jury may be sent out again." In that sense the term "insufficient" means
inadequate or lacking in some requirement, purpose or use. The general and
well-established rule is that so long as the jury is functioning as such in the
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course of the trial and until it is discharged, it is subject to directions and
instructions from the court to the end that the issues be fully tried, deliberated
upon and a correct verdict rendered. And where it is apparent that there is
some patent error in connection with the verdict, the court may of course call
the matter to their attention and direct them to redeliberate. In that regard it
has been held, sensibly and properly, that where an amount is erroneously
included the court may direct the jury to retire and correct it. The trial court
appears to have acted not only within its prerogative but properly and
discreetly in handling the situation.
Id. (emphasis added).
Presumably, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court acted "within its
prerogative," means that the trial court acted within its discretion, and that standard of review
is abuse of discretion. The plain language of Rule 47(r) invests the trial court with
substantial discretion to correct jury verdicts, and the Utah Supreme Court and this Court
have committed related matters to the sound discretion of the trial court.6
Consequently, this Court should affirm the trial Court's clarification of the jury
verdict unless it was arbitrary and capricious, or with no reasonable basis. See, e.g.,
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d937,938 (Utah 1993); Ute-CalLandDevp. Corp.
v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Utah 1980) (affirming submission of additional

6

See, e.g, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construct., 977 P.2d 518,
522 (Utah App. 1999)(whether to open judgment for additional evidence or for new trial);
Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205,206 (Utah App. 1998) (whether to grant relief from judgment
pursuant to Rule 60); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 803-04 (Utah 1991)
(whether to amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59); Ute-Cal Land Devp. Corp. v. Sather, 605
P.2d 1240, 1246 (Utah 1980) ("Rule 49(a) grants to the trial court discretion in considering
issues raised by the pleadings but not addressed by the jury under a special verdict."); Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District v. Nelson 358 P.2d 81,84 (Utah 1960) ("entering judgment
in accordance with the answers [to special interrogatories, but not the general verdict] is
within the discretion of the trial court" pursuant to Rule 49).
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interrogatories to clarify an ambiguity, because it "was not arbitrary or capricious"). For the
reasons stated below, the trial Court acted properly and discretely, and well within its
discretion, to obtain a correct verdict.
B.

The Court Did Not Coerce the Jury to Accept its "View" of the Evidence.

Wasatch characterizes the trial Court's questioning of the jury as a "blatant attempt"
to "control the verdict," and asserts that the trial Court "coerced the jury to accept and follow
his view of the evidence, or at least created enough uncertainty to allow his own inference
of jury intent to supplant the true verdict." App. Br. at 31 (emphasis in original).
Wasatch's assertion is preposterous. There is no suggestion in the record that the trial
Court had any bias or any "view" of the evidence. Any fair reading of the record shows that
the trial Court was decidedly impartial and neutral in questioning the jury, and did nothing
more than clarify the jury's intention and verdict.
To manufacture a hint of bias, Wasatch quotes out of context the foreman's answer
to the trial Court's initial question. Wasatch quotes the answer as "We believe that to be
book value." Wasatch asserts that this answer "is consistent with the verdict answer" (i.e.,
that $135,671.96 is the book value of Wasatch, not Eggett's shares), and argues that the trial
Court "should have dropped the inquiry" at this point. App. Br. at 29.
Wasatch utterly ignores and does not bring to this Court's attention the rest of the
foreman's initial answer, which squarely contradicts Wasatch's entire argument:
Do I understand, Mr. Robertson, that the jury's decision, as I've read
this question number five, is this the value that the jury believes should be paid
for the shares?
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MR. ROBERTSON: We believe that to be the book value.
THE COURT: And soMR. ROBERTSON: Paid for the shares.
THE COURT: So from the, I think the question was confusing and
that's why I wanted to ask that question. . . .
(Tr. 989-90) (emphasis added).
In response to Wasatch's objection to the Court's authority to question the jurors, the
trial Court said: "I'm not going to allow that to stand if it is a mistake. So if I can find that
out now, I will find that out now." (Tr. at 990). The trial Court then asked the jury foreman
the question a second time, and the jury foreman confirmed his earlier answer:
What you're saying by that, let me just be sure that I understand what
we're talking about. Is this the value that you think the corporation owes to
Mr. Eggett to purchase his shares?
MR. ROBERTSON:

Yes.

Id.
Thus, the jury foreman told the trial Court that $ 13 5,671.96 was the amount to be paid
for the shares before the trial Court stated that Question No. 5 was "confusing," before
Wasatch's counsel objected, and before the trial Court stated that it would not allow the
verdict answer to stand "if it is a mistake." The foreman's first answer destroys Wasatch's
inherently implausible assertion, App. Br. at 30, that the foreman was improperly influenced
by the trial Court's response to Wasatch's objection, and changed his answer to comply with
the trial Court's view of the evidence.
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In any event, Wasatch's assertion is inherently implausible even if the trial Court had
responded to Wasatch's objection before the foreman answered. It defies common sense to
believe that the foreman changed his answer in the moment after he heard the Court's
response - that, but for the Court's response, he would have answered "no" to the question,
"Is this the value [$135,671.96] that the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to purchase his
shares?" The trial Court simply stated that it thought the "question was confusing," and
invited the foreman to clarify the confusion, phrasing the problem in the subjunctive: "I'm
not going to allow that to stand if it is a mistake. So, if I can find that out now, I will find
that out now." Id. (emphasis added).
Nor did the trial Court coerce the jurors to change their answers when it polled them,
as Wasatch asserts. App. Br. at 31. Immediately following the foreman's second answer,
the trial Court addressed the entire jury, again in the subjunctive:
THE COURT: All right. Now I'm going to ask that question of all of
you as jurors if you concur in that determination.
Id. (emphasis added). Following Wasatch's sidebar objection, the trial Court began by
telling the jurors that it "just want[ed]" to explain "the problem" to "get a clear understanding
of what your decision is," and ended by asking the jurors to state "if any of you disagree":
We know from the facts of this case that Mr. Eggett owns 36.5 percent
[of Wasatch's shares]. If I interpret your answer to this question to be
$135,000.00 for book value, [sic] That would mean that he would be entitled
to 36.5 percent of $135,000. If I understand it the way I have now asked
you the question, he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a number that you
have come to by some calculation method for the purchase of his shares of
stock. So, in other words, this figure, 135,000, is a representative figure due
to him which represents 36 percent of x which is a larger number. All right?
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Now, I want to be sure that I understand that correctly and if any of you
disagree with that, I want to know that.
First, Mrs. Hamilton, is that your verdict as I've just explained it?
Id. at 991-92 (emphasis added). Mrs. Hamilton and every other juror responded, "yes". Id.
Contrary to Wasatch's assertion that the polling question was misleading, compound,
and confusing, App. Br. at 31, everyone in the courtroom clearly understood it and the jurors'
answers. The trial Court was well within its discretion to summarize the two possible
interpretations of the written answer. If the trial Court had simply repeated Question No, 5
to the foreman or to the jury, as Wasatch asserts it should have done, App. Br. at 31, the
Court would have faced the substantial risk that the jury would not recognize the problem
and would perpetuate the mistake.
When each juror answered "yes" to the question, "[i]s that your verdict as I've just
explained it," each juror was answering "it the way [the trial Court has] now asked you the
question." In other words, each juror was answering the same question that the trial Court
had just asked the foreman twice, and which the trial Court had just told the jurors "[n]ow
I'm going to ask that question of all of you." No one in the courtroom had any doubt about
the jurors' answers. That is why the trial Court entered judgment in the amount of
$135,671.96. Neither the jurors nor Wasatch's counsel suggested that the trial Court's
question was confusing, or that the trial Court misunderstood the jurors' answers. If Wasatch
really believed the polling question ambiguous or confusing, Wasatch had an opportunity and
a duty to seek clarification before the jury was discharged. That Wasatch did not do so
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waives its objection to the form of the questions asked by the trial Court. See, e.g., Bennion
v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985) ("When special
interrogatories or verdicts are ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to object to the
filing of the verdict or to move that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for clarification"
before the jury is discharged).
In summary, nothing supports Wasatch's assertion that the trial court coerced the jury
to change its "true verdict." The trial Court never suggested to the jury any view of the
evidence, or that the verdict may be "irrational," or even that the verdict may be inconsistent
with the evidence of book value presented by the parties. The trial Court never pressured the
jurors to accept any view of the evidence. The trial Court simply asked questions, began
each question with the subjunctive "if," and asked the jurors to tell the Court if they
disagreed with the Court's summary of the foreman's prior answers.
The trial Court's questioning was significantly less intrusive and more neutral than
questioning upheld in similar contexts.7 Moreover, any conceivable risk the Court's inquiry
coerced the jurors was ameliorated by MUJI Instruction No. 2.6, which informed the jurors
in part that it "has never been" the trial Court's "intention to give any hint that you should
return one verdict or another," that the Court does "not wish in any way to influence your

7

In Karl v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1989), the trial court
sua sponte (and in the absence of counsel) addressed jurors "at some length concerning their
answers to special interrogatories," concluded that the answers were inconsistent, and sent
the jury out for further deliberation. The Court of Appeals found "no error in the district
court's actions," noting that "all of the judge's communications were in open court and on
the record, and such communications were not erroneous as a matter of law." 880 F.2d at
70, 72.
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verdict/' and that the jurors should "disregard anything" the Court "may have said or done
if it made you think that [the Court] preferred one verdict over another." (Tr. 914.)
C.

The Trial Court Had Ample Authority under Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) to Clarify
the Jury's Intention and Verdict.

Wasatch argues that the trial Court lacked authority to clarify the jury's intention and
verdict under Utah R.Civ. P. 47(r), which states:
If a verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury
under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
Wasatch argues that the trial Court did not determine that the written interrogatory answer
was "informal or insufficient" under Rule 47(r), but determined that there was insufficient
evidence to support it, which must be challenged by a motion for a new trial under Rule
59(a). App. Br. at 25, 27.
This argument rests on a complete distortion of what the trial Court actually did. The
trial Court did not "substitute its judgment for that of the jury," App. Br. at 24-5, did not
determine that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, App. Br. at 28, and made
no additional finding of fact, much less a finding that contravened the jury's findings. Nor
did the trial Court enter judgment nov or grant a new trial. Wasatch's many citations to the
standard for setting aside a jury verdict under Rules 50 and 59 are irrelevant,8 and its

%

See Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (upholding court's
discretion in granting a new trial); Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983)
(affirming denial of jnov and new trial motions); Ute-Cal Land Devp. Corp. v. Sather, 605
P.2d 1240, 1248 (Utah 1980); Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass 'n, 470 P.2d (1970) (denial
of new trial); First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Luhndahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969)
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footnote continued

invocation of the "inviolability" of a jury verdict is merely rhetorical. In fact, the trial Court
preserved the inviolability of the jury verdict by clarifying it.
As the record makes crystal clear, the trial Court found the interrogatory "confusing"
(Tr. 990), "ambiguous" (Tr. 993), and thought the answer may have been a "mistake" (Tr.
990.) The concern was whether the jury intended its answer to be the book value of Eggett's
shares, or the book value of Wasatch; i.e., did the jury answer one question while the written
interrogatory asked another? That concern goes to the form and sufficiency of the verdict,
not the sufficiency of the supporting evidence. See, e.g.,Langton v. International Transport,
Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Utah 1971) (because jury verdict "was defective in form in that
it did not comprehend all the items of damage contained in the instructions given by the
court, it was therefore insufficient").
As Wasatch admits, the plain language of Rule 47(r) authorizes the trial Court to
advise the jury to correct an "informal," "insufficient," or "irregular" verdict. App. Br. at 2728. Wasatch attempts to circumvent this plain language by arguing that Rule 47(r) applies
only to "patent" errors that are "obvious on the face of the verdict." App. Br. at 25. The
assertion is a quibble. Once the jury foreman told the trial Court that $135,671.96 was the
book value to be "paid for the shares," not the book value of Wasatch, the error was patent

(trial judge made an additional finding of fact that was inherently inconsistent with the jury's
findings); EFCO Distributing Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah 1966) (upholding
denial of motions for jnov and new trial); Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1957)
(affirming trial court's refusal to declare mistrial); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977
P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1999).
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and obvious.
Wasatch argues that the trial Court had "no right or justification to question the jury
verdict," App. Br. at 24, but the Court was well within its discretion in doing so. Aside from
the Court's finding that the interrogatory was confusing and ambiguous, the entire trial would
have led the Court to ask whether the jury intended its verdict to be the book value of
Eggett's shares. Both counsel in opening argument told the jury that it would be called upon
to determine the book value of Eggett's shares.9 (Tr. 69,78, 81.) Eggett's damage evidence
and testimony showed the jury how to calculate the book value of Eggett's shares from total
stockholders' equity. (App. Br. Add. 53.) The other interrogatories all asked the jury to
determine the amount to be awarded to Eggett or to Wasatch on its counterclaims. (App. Br.
Add. 7-9.) The jury was not told or instructed that the Court would determine the book value
of Eggett's shares once the jury determined the book value of Wasatch.
Equally important, the trial Court was well within its discretion in noting that
$135,671.96 would have been "irrationally selected" if it were the book value of Wasatch.
(Tr. 995.) Wasatch presented evidence that Wasatch's book value was $75,452, based upon
the audited financial statements. (Add. 63; Tr. 669.) Eggett presented evidence that total
stockholders' equity, including the adjustments necessary to rectify Wasatch's bad faith, was

9

Wasatch's counsel told the jury that it would have to decide two issues: "One is
what is he supposed to get for his stock. At the time he quit he owned 36.5% of the stock,
a little more than a third of the company and there's a contract that talks about what he's
supposed to get and you're going to have to decide the issues with regard to that." (Tr. 78)
(emphasis added).
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$699,778. (App. Br. Add. 53.) As Wasatch argues, App. Br. at 34, the jury was free to
accept some of Eggett's adjustments but not others, and the jury clearly did so. An
adjustment of $296,252 for the suspense items alone to the audited book value of $75,452
makes the book value of Eggett's shares $135,671.96, or precisely the jury verdict C$75,452
+ $296,252 x 36.5% = $135,671.96). Further, it must be emphasized and reemphasized that
the trial Court did not rely on its belief that the interrogatory answer was "irrational" to set
aside the jury verdict. The trial Court merely asked the jury foreman a question to confirm
whether a possible mistake was an actual mistake, and then polled the jury.
In effect, Wasatch seeks an interpretation of Rule 47(r) that would prohibit a trial
Court from questioning jurors to determine whether a possible mistake was an actual
mistake. No legal authority supports such an interpretation, and much authority opposes it.
In Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 383 P.2d at 935, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's questioning the jury foreman "about the possibility of a quotient or chance verdict."
See also, Poduska, v. Ward, 895 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1990) (court's questions to jurors and
instructions to redeliberate "afforded the jury a timely opportunity to straighten out both
apparent and possible mistakes") (emphasis added); Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865
F.2d 431, 443-44 (1st Cir. 1989) (same).
Also in effect, Wasatch asks this Court to substitute its judgment for the trial Court's
judgment about the "rationality"of the verdict or the "obviousness" of a possible mistake.
The trial Court, however,
[which] has observed the jury during the trial, prepared the questions and
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explained them to the jury, is in the best position to determine whether the
answers reflect confusion or uncertainty. The judge also is in an excellent
position to evaluate whether the jury will likely be able to resolve this
uncertainty with proper guidance.
Karl v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 72-3 (8th Cir. 1989) (construing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 49).
Wasatch's attempt to distinguish the "patent" and "obvious" errors in the authorities
it cites confirms that the trial Court here acted properly. In Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra,
the jury's award included "odd amounts." The verdict was "regular on its face," and within
the range presented by the parties. Nonetheless, the trial court questioned the jury about the
odd amounts, determined that the jury had improperly awarded travel expenses, and directed
the jury to reconsider its verdict. See 383 P.2d at 935.
In Brown v. Johnson, 412 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the trial court instructed the jury that
its award of special damages could not exceed $377.50. The jury awarded $10,000 in special
damages, and $ 1,700 in general damages, or $ 11,700 total damages. The trial court told the
jury that "there appears on the face of it an obvious error," and directed the jury to deliberate
further. After a few moments, the jury returned with a corrected verdict, awarding $377.50
in special damages and $11,322.50 in general damages, or the same $11,700 total damages.
In affirming the verdict, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the
error was undoubtedly induced by failure on the part of the jury to understand
the difference between the terms "general damage" and "special damage." It
is obvious that after deliberating on the evidence, the jury had arrived at a
verdict of $11,700, and so the only amount of time which they would require
to correct the verdict would be that which would enable them to adjust the
figures between general and special damages.
472 P.2d at 945-46.
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In Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264,265-66 (Utah 1957), the Supreme Court approved the
trial court's questioning the jurors to determine what they meant when they answered
interrogatories by stating that they were "unable to say" whether a party was negligent. By
asking questions, the trial court determined that the jurors intended their answer to mean that
they were "unable to say" that a party was negligent, based on a preponderance of the
evidence, not that the jurors were confused or deadlocked. The Supreme Court affirmed,
noting that the trial
court's questioning of the jury respecting their answers adroitly led them to the
conclusion that they were not confused by the propositions, but were merely
unconvinced by the evidence.
We are unable to see from a reading of the record wherein defendant was
prejudiced by the [interrogatory] questions; particularly is the fact emphasized
by the examination of the jurors after their verdict had been returned.
308 P.2d at 266.
The ambiguity or error in the verdict here is no more or less "patent" or "obvious"
than the errors in these decisions. Here, as in Brown, the error or ambiguity "was
undoubtedly induced by the failure of the jury to understand" that it answered a different
question than the interrogatory asked. Here, as in Jorgensen and Baker the trial court
confirmed that a possible mistake was an actual mistake by questioning the jurors.
These cases also squarely contradict Wasatch's argument, App. Br. at 29, that the trial
Court should not have questioned the jury foreman or polled the jury, but was required to
direct the jury to redeliberate. Moreover, the argument ignores the plain language of Rule
47(r), which permits, but does not require, the jury to be sent out after it has been advised by
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the trial court. Here, the jurors' unanimous and unequivocal answers made deliberation
unnecessary. If any of the jurors had answered "no" to the trial Court's question, or said that
he or she was confused, then further deliberation may have been warranted. Cf. U. R. Grim
P. 16 (the jury in a criminal case may be polled, and "if there is no unanimous concurrence,
the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations ...") As it was, there was nothing
to deliberate.
Finally, Wasatch argues that the trial Court lacked authority to find the written
interrogatory "ambiguous" because undersigned counsel did not object to it before the jury
retired, or to the verdict before the jury was discharged. App. Br. at 32. The argument is a
complete red herring. First, there can be no doubt that the trial court has authority to correct
mistakes or to clarify ambiguous verdicts sua sponte, since it can direct a verdict or grant a
new trial sua sponte. See, e.g., Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n., 470 P.2d 393, 396
(Utah 1970) (directed verdict); Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984) (new trial).
Indeed, the trial Court appears to have questioned the jury sua sponte in Jorgensen, Cook,
and Brown, supra.
Second, the trial Court can correct an ambiguity at any time before the jury is
discharged, whether or not counsel has objected to the special verdict form before the jury
retired. See, e.g., Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., supra, 701 P.2d at 1082
("counsel has an obligation either to object to the filing of the verdict or to move that the
cause be resubmitted to the jury for clarification" before the jury is discharged): Jorgensen,
supra, 383 P.2d at 935 ("so long as the jury is functioning as such in the course of the trial
and until it is discharged, it is subject to directions and instructions from the court to the end
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that the issues be fully tried, deliberated upon and a correct verdict rendered") (emphasis
added).
Third, the absence of an objection is irrelevant, because Eggett is not appealing the
jury verdict. Again, this Court can affirm on any ground available to the trial Court, even
one not relied upon below, and Eggett can raise any ground for affirmance. See, e.g., Orton
v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998); Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass 'n., 470 P.2d 393,
397 & n. 7 (Utah 1970). The trial Court's sua sponte clarification preserves the issue in the
absence of an objection.
D.

Any Errors by the Trial Court in Clarifying the Jury Verdict Are Harmless.

Any errors by the trial Court in questioning and polling the jury (as opposed to the
authority of the Court to do so) are harmless, because the jury unquestionably intended
$ 13 5,671.96 to be the amount awarded to Eggett. Again, the jury foreman twice told the trial
Court that it was the amount to be "paid for the shares." The jury clearly calculated the book
value of Eggett's shares, because $135,671.96 corresponds exactly to the audited book value
of Wasatch, with an adjustment for the suspense account, multiplied by Eggett's ownership
percentage.
Significantly, Wasatch questioned the jurors after the jury was discharged, but
presented no affidavits to the trial Court explaining that the jury intended a different verdict.
See, e.g., Brown v. Johnson, supra, All P.2d at 946 ("While jurors may not by affidavit or
otherwise impeach their verdict, they may give proof to explain it.") Because there is no
likelihood that the jury verdict would be different if the trial Court had asked a different
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question, or directed the jury to redeliberate rather than poll them, any procedural error by
the Court was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 395 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah Sup. Ct. May
5,2000) ("A harmful error occurs when the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence
or the error is sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence in the verdict."); Baker v.
Cook, supra, 370 P.2d at 266 (affirming trial court's questioning of the jury because "[w]e
are unable to see from a reading of the record wherein defendant was prejudiced by the
questions").
In summary, the trial Court properly exercised its discretion under Rule 47(r) to
clarify a possible insufficient or informal verdict. Because the Court's timely action
preserved the jury's intention and true verdict, the verdict should be upheld and Wasatch's
appeal denied.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES,
In a Supplemental Judgment (App. Br. Add. 4-6), the trial Court awarded Eggett as

the prevailing party $60,374.43 in costs and attorney's fees. The award was based on an
attorney's fee provision in the Shareholders' Agreement (App. Br. Add. 29); Eggett's
Employment Agreement had no attorney's fee provision. Wasatch seeks to vacate the award,
arguing (i) that the trial Court made no findings, or "conclusory" findings, about the fees, and
that (ii) Eggett made no attempt to segregate recoverable fees from non-recoverable fees i.e., fees incurred to prosecute his claim for book value of his shares under the Shareholders'
Agreement from his claim for additional compensation under the Employment Agreement,
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or from Wasatch's counterclaims.

Wasatch's arguments are simply wrong. The trial Court did make findings:
Based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good
cause appearing, the Court finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett is entitled to an
award of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in the amount of $60,374.43.
The Court finds that these costs, expenses, and fees are reasonable. The Court
also finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett has made a proper and reasonable
segregation between those claims to which he is entitled to an award of costs,
expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to such an
award. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) the claims brought by Mr. Eggett
to recover book value for his shares pursuant to his Shareholder Agreement
were the predominant claims at trial; (2) the facts to be discovered and tried on
Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement are so intertwined
with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims and counterclaims
that it is not possible to segregate or to distinguish them. Accordingly, the
Court finds that it is proper and reasonable to segregate those costs, expenses,
and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett before May 16, 1997, from those costs,
expenses, and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett after May 16, 1997, when Mr.
Eggett5s claims under the Shareholder Agreement arose.
(Supplemental Judgment, App. Br. Add. 5-6.)
Significantly, Wasatch approved the Court's findings as to form (App. Br. Add. 6).
If Wasatch questioned the adequacy of the findings, it should have done so below. To hear
Wasatch "complain now of the procedural deficiency smacks of invited error, which is
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor." Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d
1107, 1116 (Utah App. 1999), quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah 1994).
"Because invited error precludes judicial review," this Court should "decline to address this
argument further." Miller, supra, 983 P.2d atl 116.
Should this Court consider the matter further, however, the trial Court's findings were
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proper and within its discretion. The findings were based upon the Affidavit (App. Br. Add.
80-88) and Reply Affidavit (App. Br. 89-95) of undersigned counsel, and oral argument, and
well as the trial Court's inherent knowledge of the issues and proceedings. The initial
Affidavit appended all billing statements and time entries. (R. 297-330.)
Squarely contrary to Wasatch's assertion, App. Br. at 36, both the initial Affidavit and
Reply Affidavit apportioned recoverable from non-recoverable fees. The initial Affidavit
explained that Eggett retained undersigned counsel in late April 1997 to secure additional
compensation to which Eggett was entitled pursuant to his Employment Agreement. The
scope of the representation expanded when Wasatch terminated Eggett for cause and notified
him shortly after May 16, 1997, that it would pay him par value, not book value, for his
shares. From that point forward, Eggett asserted a claim for book value of his shares
pursuant to the Shareholders' Agreement. (App. Br. Add. 82, Tflf 8-9.)
The initial Affidavit segregated fees incurred before May 16, 1997, from those
incurred afterward, because the earlier fees related solely to Eggett's claims for additional
compensation pursuant to the Shareholders' Agreement. (Id., f 6.) The Reply Affidavit
redacted certain fees incurred after May 16, 1997, that did not relate to Eggett's claim for
breach of the Shareholders' Agreement. (App. Br. Add. 94-95, f 10).
The Affidavits did not segregate fees further, because Eggett's claim for breach of the
Shareholders' Agreement was inextricably intertwined with his claim for breach of the
Employment Agreement, and with Wasatch's counterclaims. Eggett's claim for breach of
the Shareholders' Agreement required Eggett to prove that his purported termination for
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cause was wrongful and in bad faith, and a pretext to deny him book value for his shares.
As a ground for termination, Wasatch asserted that Eggett took excessive compensation
between 1995 and his resignation, and abused his expense account. (App. Br. Add. 33). To
prove a breach of the Shareholders' Agreement, Eggett had to prove that he had not taken
excessive compensation or abused his expense account. Accordingly, every fact relating to
Eggett's compensation claim and Wasatch's counterclaim would have been litigated whether
or not those claims had been filed, because Wasatch asserted them as a defense to Eggett's
claim for book value. The various claims did not simply involved a common core of facts;
the facts supporting one claim were asserted as a defense to the other. (App. Br. Add. 82-83,
If 10; App. Br. Add. 90,ffl[3-5.)
The trial Court acted well within its discretion in finding that (i) Eggett's claim for
breach of the Shareholders' Agreement was the predominant claim at trial, and (ii) that the
"facts to be discovered and tried on Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholders'
Agreement are so intertwined with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims
and counterclaims that it is not possible to segregate or to distinguish them." As this Court
held in Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), cited by Wasatch:
In Utah, the calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a
clear abuse of discretion. In this case, the trial court denied the Harrigans'
motion for attorney fees because only one of the Schafirs' claims stemmed
from the contract and any "fees or costs uniquely applicable to the
[contractual] warranty claim are insignificant." Although the trial court could
have attempted to allocate a portion of the fees to the contractual warranty
claim, it decided against such action because "it would not be appropriate."
We believe that the trial court is in the best position to determine how much
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of the attorney's time was spent on each of the four issues. In addition, we
think that the trial court should determine whether an allocation of fees is
appropriate under the circumstances. In this case, the trial court felt it was
inappropriate and we defer to its decision because there is no clear abuse of
discretion.
879 P.2d at 1394 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
This Court repeatedly held that, where a prevailing party can recover legal fees on
some claims but not others, the party can recover all fees if the claims involve a common
core of facts. Most recently, this Court stated:
Where a contract provides the right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed
a party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the
fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful.
Furthermore, when a plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a common core
of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least some of its claims,
it is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably incurred in the
litigation.
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222,227 (Utah App. 1999) (emphasis added).
This Court upheld an award in Dejavue, Inc., strikingly similar to the award here:
In the present case, Dejavue successfully defended against U.S. Energy's
breach of contract counterclaim. Accordingly, Dejavue is entitled to attorney
fees under the sublease agreement. Furthermore, Dejavue's contract and tort
claims were based on related legal theories involving a common core of facts.
The trial court specifically found that the claims advanced by Dejavue, and
interposed as defenses to the counterclaims, were based on inter-related legal
theories and arose from a common core of facts.... Each of Dejavue's claims
submitted to the jury was intertwined with its defense of the breach of contract
. . .counterclaims and arose from a common core of facts.
993 P.2d at 227 (emphasis added).
In Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999), cert, denied
994P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999), also cited by Wasatch, this Court summarized its prior decisions,
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noting that
We have awarded fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may
not have been incurred on strictly compensable issues, because proof of the
compensable and non-compensable claims overlapped,
and recognizing that:
where the proof a compensable claim and an otherwise non-compensable
claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party
is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts.
978 P2d at 483. Accord, First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah App.
1996) (reversing trial court's award of fees to a contractor on a foreclosure claim but not on
its defense to the homeowner's counterclaim, because the two were inextricably tied
together); Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219,226 (Utah App. 1991) (noting that, although "the
minute entry is somewhat sketchy," the trial court was satisfied that the prevailing party was
entitled to all fees, and that because these complex issues were so intertwined, we find the
court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney fees").
The trial Court's findings explained that Eggett's claim for breach of the Shareholder
Agreement was the dominant claim at trial, and explained that an award of all fees after May
16,1997, was appropriate because the claims and facts were intertwined. These findings are
more than sufficient to support the allocation and award. The findings are more detailed that
the "sketchy minute entry" affirmed in Sprouse, supra, or the conclusory statement that a
segregation of fees "would not be appropriate," affirmed in Schafir, supra, or in any of the
other cases cited by Wasatch. See, e.g., Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1116
(Utah App. 1999) (trial Court failed to distinguish at all between recoverable and non-
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recoverable fees, or explain why an award of all fees was appropriate); Cottonwood Mall Co.
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266,268 (Utah 1982)(trial court made no findings to support an award, and
the request for fees did not specify work performed, time expended, rates charged, or
distinguish at all between recoverable and non-recoverable fees); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 317-18 (Utah 1998) (trial court awarded all fees without recognizing that the
litigation involved several phases and several parties, and that the prevailing party failed to
segregate fees incurred against other parties, or fees incurred before the defendant was joined
in the lawsuit).
Because the trial Court's fee award was proper, and within its discretion, and because
its findings were more than adequate to explain the basis of the award, this Court should
affirm the award and deny Wasatch's appeal.
Finally, to the extent that Eggett prevails on this appeal, Eggett is entitled to an award
of costs and attorney's fees incurred on appeal. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, supra, 961 P.2d
at 319; (Utah 1998); Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., supra, 978 P.2d at 476.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum, this Court should affirm the trial Court
rulings and the jury verdict. Specifically, this Court should hold that the trial Court properly
admitted evidence of accounting adjustments on Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. This Court should also hold that the trial Court properly
exercised its discretion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) in clarifying the jury's intention and
verdict that $ 135,671.96 was the book value of Eggett's shares and the amount to be awarded
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to Eggett. This Court should also hold that the trial Court properly exercised its discretion
in awarding Eggett $60,374.43 in costs and attorney's fees as the prevailing party.
Finally, this Court should award to Eggett his costs, expenses and attorney's fees
incurred in this appeal,
Respectfully submitted thistrL day of August, 2000.

Perrin RZ L0ve
Clyde, STOW, Sessions & Swenson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Roger K. Eggett, Jr.
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